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Abstract
This paper addresses the issue of the optimal standard of proof in crim-
inal law. It is assumed that people in society care about both fairness and
deterrence. It is important to punish those who are guilty and only those.
However, error is unavoidable and hence a trade-o¤ emerges between the
three aims of punishing the guilty, not punishing the innocent and deterring
potential criminals. It is shown that when only deterrence matters the op-
timal standard of proof is a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard (given
some other assumptions) while if fairness is an issue the standard will gen-
erally be stricter and involve Bayesian up-dating. When both fairness and
deterrence matter the standard of proof will (generally) lie in between the
two standards. An example illustrates how the model might be applied in
practice to determine the optimal standard of proof for a given crime.
1. Introduction
The standard of proof is of central importance in almost any legal regulation. In
general, a high standard of proof creates fewer false ’convictions’, but more false
acquittals and hence often less deterrence. In this paper we focus on criminal
law. The question analyzed is the following: If a society holds certain aggregate
preferences on the seriousness of a false acquittal, on the seriousness of a false
conviction and on how these ’costs’ compare with the ’cost’ of the crime itself, then
how much certainty would that society want before convicting one of its members
of a crime1? The starting point of the analysis is the realization that full certainty
concerning guilt can only rarely be obtained. This may be an understatement;
recent application of DNA-tests to criminal cases from the past suggests that
erroneous convictions are not as rare and unique as sometimes believed2.
We will assume that people in society hold views concerning what is a ’proper’
sanction for a given o¤ence, and that people will dislike if the sanction is either
(much) lower or (much) higher than this. In extension, we will assume that society
su¤ers a welfare loss by false convictions. The falsely convicted will know he is
innocent and is likely to su¤er a loss due to being sanctioned which is higher
than he would feel if he were guilty. The rest of society will not know whether
a given person is guilty or not (though people may form beliefs in this regard)
but we assume that people dislike, from a fairness perspective, the idea that false
convictions occur3 .
In some legal cases4, fairness may not be very important5 . Hence, it seems
worthwile establishing as a benchmark the optimal standard of proof when deter-
rence is the only concern. We also establish the optimal standard of proof when
fairness is the only concern. However, the question which we are mainly inter-
ested in is what the standard of proof should be when both deterrence and fairness
matter. We show that the optimal standard of proof will except in an exceptional
case lie between the two benchmarks just mentioned when both deterrence and
1This question is sometimes ignored or even denied in legal discourse where ’legal security’ is
sometimes treated as an absolute good that should not be traded-o¤ against other goods such
as deterrence.
2For American evidence involving capital cases, see e.g. Liebman et. al. [9].
3The same assumptions are made by e.g. Miceli [10]; see also Andreoni [1].
4especially when we include civil law sanctions such as remedies for breach of contract. The
focus of this article is on criminal law but some of the analysis applies to civil law as well.
5This may e.g. be the case in civil law disputes, such as in a tort case, where both parties
may be insured.
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fairness are social aims, and we attempt to establish how the trade-o¤ should be
made in an actual case.
To determine the optimal standard of proof it will be necessary to simulta-
neously determine other variables such as the level of sanctions and the level of
enforcement. For example, if punishment is very harsh this may call for a higher
standard of proof than if punishment is more lenient since it may be felt to be
more serious to falsely convict a person when the sanction is heavy. We will hence
address the question of the optimal standard of proof within a model that simul-
taneously determines also the optimal sanction and optimal levels of enforcement6
in the presence of uncertainty concerning guilt.
Analyzing what is the optimal standard of proof leads one to consider the
meaning of the concept itself, since it is not as clear as intuition may perhaps
suggest. One may associate the notion of ’standard of proof’ with the notion of
’probability of guilt’ but that may be misleading. Probability of guilt involves
Bayesian updating of prior probabilities with the advent of new information (evi-
dence), but it may not be optimal to do Bayesian updating. It may be optimal for
society that the judge looks only at the evidence of the case before him and not at
the prior probability that the defendant would commit such an act. To illustrate
the importance of this distinction, imagine two societies, A and B, where in A very
few people even consider committing theft while almost everyone in B lacks moral
notions and commit theft if it is to their (amoral) personal advantage. Imagine
further that two people are apprehended by the police, one in each society, and
that the evidence raised against them turns out to be identical. Ignoring the issue
of equality before the law, should the courts then treat the two cases in the same
way (if we abstract from the fact that preferences concerning proper punishment
is likely to di¤er between the two societies)? As a contribution of this paper, it
will be shown to depend on the aims of society (deterrence or fairness) and on
whether sanctions are socially costly.
The article follows the approach to criminal law initiated by Bentham, revived
by Becker[2] and further developed by Shavell and Polinsky, among others (for an
overview see [17], and Garoupa [5]).
More speci…cally, we shall address the issue within a model by Shavell and
Polinsky [18] that incorporates fairness concerns. The model of the present article
di¤ers from the Shavell and Polinsky model by assuming that a judge (or jurors)
must base verdicts on imperfect information about how people have acted. This
6Since these variables are of interest in themselves we shall at points digress brie‡y to interpret
the results.
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entails the risk that someone will be falsely convicted; as mentioned above, we
shall assume that people (including the falsely convicted) will thereby su¤er a
welfare loss due to a feeling of unfairness over and above the loss due to the
sanction itself.
Two important papers by Miceli: [10] and [11] are closely related to the present
one. In [11], Miceli analyzes the question of the optimal standard of proof assum-
ing that only fairness, not deterrence, matters, and in [10] he analyzes the optimal
levels of enforcement and punishment when both fairness and deterrence matter.
In the latter paper, uncertainty is present but the standard of proof is taken as
given. In contrast, the present paper analyzes the optimal standard of proof when
both fairness and deterrence matter7.
Concerning the speci…cation of the model, two distinctions are worth making.
The …rst concerns an e¤ect which has been discussed by Png [12], namely that the
risk of being falsely convicted of a crime lowers the incentive to obey the law since
it lowers the expected sanction for committing the illegal act. For certain kinds
of crimes, however, this e¤ect is not present. It can be excluded for those kinds
of crime, e.g. murder, where not committing the illegal act implies that there
will be no harm, hence no investigation and no possibility of a false conviction
for this particular (non-existing) crime. For other kinds of illegal behavior, it
may play a role particularly if the probability of false conviction is high. The
example analyzed by Png [12] concerns careless driving. If a motorcyclist risks
being falsely convicted of careless driving in the event of an accident, this may
lower his incentive to drive carefully, Png maintains. Our model concerns the
latter kind of behavior where the e¤ect is, at least potentially, present, but the
model only needs slight modi…cation to be useful for analyzing the former kind
of behavior. We will do so to analyze the optimal standard of proof when only
deterrence matters.
The second distinction concerns whether the police is faced with the question:
’who among several suspects did it?’ rather than with the question: ’did person A
do it, or was it an accident/has there been observational error’? Again, murder
sometimes falls in the …rst category. When someone has been murdered, the prob-
lem can be to identify the o¤ender among several potential o¤enders. Tax-evasion
and speeding, on the other hand, fall in the second category where investigations
7There are some other di¤erences. Miceli does not consider the possibility of over-deterrence
(rightly so for such crimes as murder); he does not make use of the concept of the likelihood
ratio and the way in which he models the legal system is in minor ways di¤erent from that of
the present paper.
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usually only concern the actions of one person. Murder-cases can also be of this
kind, as when it is uncertain whether someone was shot, as an act of will or as an
accident (’the gun went o¤’). In terms of modeling, the former kind of crime is
more like a moral-hazard-in-teams problem while the latter is more like a simple,
one-agent moral hazard problem which is simpler to analyze. In this article we
will analyze the case where only one person’s actions are involved. The question
is whether a harm can be attributed to the unlawful, reckless or negligent actions
of somebody or whether the harm has been caused by (pure) accident. One ex-
ample would be the following: …sh are found dead in a lake and suspicion falls on
a …rm for having emitted a larger amount of some substance into the lake than
permitted. While the evidence points in this direction it does so with less than
full certainty. The …sh may be dead due to other, e.g. natural, causes8.
The article is organized as follows: In the following section the model is in-
troduced. In the two -following sections we analyze two polar cases: First the
case where only deterrence matters and fairness concerns are absent and next the
case where only fairness matters and deterrence is absent. Then we bring results
together in an analysis of the realistic case where both deterrence and fairness
matter. Discussion of an extension and a conclusion ends the article.
2. The Model
Agents are atomistic and the whole population is normalized to one. Each agent
may commit an illegal act which grants utility equal to g. g di¤ers between
agents; it has density function z(g) and cumulative distribution function Z(g):
The di¤erent gains may re‡ect di¤erent moral costs of committing a crime. Harm
to society of a criminal act is h: An agent will choose to commit a criminal act
when his expected utility is higher from this act than from other acts he can
choose. For the purpose of tractability we assume agents are risk-neutral. The
critical level of gain for which the agent will be just indi¤erent between committing
the criminal act and not committing it will be termed ~g:
We assume that the police decides on e1 which signi…es the number of cases
it chooses to go into or the level of monitoring undertaken. p(e1) will signify the
probability of being investigated or monitored. e2 will signify the resources spent
8Taking this example, our assumption in the model will be that there are many …rms facing
a similar situation, and that …rms di¤er in their utility from breaking the law. Or, alternatively,
that there is only one …rm whose type is unknown
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on accumulating evidence in a case. e2 a¤ects the precision of the information on
which a verdict is based9 .
We can express the evidence gathered by the stochastic variable (or vector)
x: The criminal act will induce one density function over x : vc(x; e2) while non-
criminal acts induce (another) density-function: vn(x; e2): We assume that the
likelihood ratio vn(x;e
2)
vc(x;e2)
is decreasing in x: Thus, a higher realized value of x implies
a higher likelihood that the person has committed the harmful act. The standard
of evidence set by the court can then be expressed as a level x, where a person
will only be convicted in court if x is larger than x. Naturally, in the absence of
uncertainty, the police will in our simpli…ed world only take those cases to court
where x > x10 .
The judge must decide whether or not to impose a sanction f when he observes
x: The sanction may be interpreted as a …ne or as imprisonment (or as the death
penalty). When the sanction is interpreted as imprisonment, it will involve a
social cost. When fairness concerns are part of the analysis, we can include the
social economic cost of sanctions in the analysis by subtracting it in the bene…t
of sanctioning the guilty and including it in the cost of sanctioning the innocent,
see below11. When only deterrence matters, we need to include the cost explicitly.
Stigma is often an important factor; if it is a linear function of the sanction our
model can incorporate it without modi…cation, otherwise we need to make minor
adjustments when the optimal level of sanctions is determined.
The system thus determines a function f(x) and we assume in line with what
is at present realistic that f(x) takes the value f for x > x and the value 0 for
x · x12 . For the case where the sanction is monetary we further assume that
9Miceli [10] models this in a slightly di¤erent way. He assumes that the police spends e¤ort
± in apprehending a person after a crime and that higher e¤ort by the police increases the
probability of apprehending the right person. ± hence corresponds to our e2 which determines
the amount of information collected in a case.
10We abstract from the existence of plea bargaining and from issues concerning the prose-
cutor’s incentives that may di¤er from society’s, see Grossman and Katz [6], Miceli [11] and
Reinganum [14].
11However, in the …rst section where deterrence is the only motive, these costs do not appear
and hence we need to introduce the social cost of imposing sanctions explicitly in this section if
we wish to interpret the sanction as imprisonment. This will not be done since the implications
are obvious.
12 It will hence be assumed that there is either full conviction or full acquittal; the possibility
that the level of certainty may determine the level of the sanction will not be explored in this
article, though it is a very important possibility. It is investigated in a tort context by Shavell
[19].
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there is a maximal …ne fmax due to limited wealth of o¤enders.
3. The Case With No Fairness-Dependent Utility
3.1. Optimal Sanctions, Enforcement and Standard of Proof
Given risk-neutrality, the maximization problem can be stated as follows:
MaxA;f;e1 ;e2W =
Z 1
eg gz(g)dg¡ (1¡ Z(~g))h¡ e1 ¡ e2
where ~g = p(e1)f
Z 1
x
vc(x; e2) ¡ vn(x; e2)dx if f · fmax
~g = p(e1)fmax
Z 1
x
vc(x; e2) ¡ vn(x; e2)dx if f > fmax
The …rst equation expresses that social welfare amounts to the welfare of those
who commit the act (which we include but which we could also omit) minus the
loss to society from the acts committed and the costs of detecting and investigat-
ing. The second equation expresses that an agent will commit the illegal act if his
bene…t of committing the criminal act exceeds the di¤erence in expected sanction
from doing rather than not doing the act13 . The third equation expresses that
only the part of a …ne that a person can pay has a deterrent e¤ect. If the sanction
is non-monetary, such as incarceration,fmax would be the life-time of the individ-
ual and the cost of incarcerating a person, c(f ); to society should be included in
theW¡function which becomes: W = R 1eg gz(g)dg¡(1¡Z(~g))h¡e1 ¡e2¡ c(f)¤
p(e1)((1¡ Z(~g)) R1x vc(x; e2)dx+ Z(~g) R1x vn(x; e2)dx). We …rst analyze the case
where sanctions are monetary.
3.1.1. Monetary Sanctions
The maximization problem is in many respects analogous to that of Shavell-
Polinsky [16].
13 If we choose the speci…cation where the non-occurrence of harm precludes the existence
of a crime, this amounts to the case where vn(x) = 0 for all x, since the only x0s that call
for an investigation involve harm. In this case we obtain: eg = p(e1)f R 1x vc(x; e2)dx: This is
the speci…cation chosen by Miceli [10]. We shall return to an implication of this alternative
speci…cation.
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We …rst state a solution to the maximization problem and then interpret the
result concerning the standard of proof. Denote a solution by ( fd; e1d; e2d; xd):
Proposition 3.1. Under the given assumptions, a solution is:
fd = fmax,
xd is given by the equation vc(xd; e2d) = vn(xd; e2d),
e1d is either zero or given by:
p0(e1d) = 1=(h ¡ ~g)z(~g)fmaxS;
e2d is either zero (if e1d = 0 or p(e1d)fmax
1R
xd
vc(xd; 0) ¡ vn(xd; 0)dx ¸ h) or given
by the equation: (h ¡ eg)z(eg)p(e1d)fmax(@(1R
xd
vc(xd; e2) ¡ vn(xd; e2)dx)=@e2) = 1
Proof of the proposition: The proof of the proposition lies essentially in the fol-
lowing idea: Assume that it is worthwhile deterring all types below some eg: Then eg
must equal p(e1)f
1R
x
vc(x; e2)¡vn(x; e2)dx: If we set f and
1R
x¤
vc(x; e2)¡vn(x; e2)dx
at their maximal levels then this will minimize the need for enforcement e1:
The results concerning e1d and e2d are quite straightforward to derive; while that
concerning xd may need a proof: The claim is that under the assumption of a
monotone likelihood ratio,
1R
x
vc(x; e2d)¡ vn(x; e2d)dx is maximized for that x which
solves vc(x; e2d) = vn(x; e2d): To prove this denote this level xd:
vc(x;e2d)
vn(x;e2d)
increasing in
x implies that vc(x; e2d) > vn(x; e2d) for x > xd and vc(x; e2d) < vn(x; e2d) for x < xd:
Hence the integral
1R
x
vc(x; e2d)¡ vn(x; e2d)dx must be maximized for x = xd:
Another way of obtaining the result is through the …rst-order condition which
reads: dWdx =
@W
@eg ¤ @eg@x = (h¡eg) ¤z(eg)¤p(e1)¤ f ¤ (vn(x; e2d)¡vc(x; e2d)): This equals
zero when vn(x; e2d) = vc(x; e2d):
Concerning e2, increasing accuracy of information will deter more people in
the measure z(eg)p(e1d)fmax(@(1R
xd
vc(xd; e2)¡vn(xd; e2)dx)=@e2) and the bene…t of so
doing is (h¡eg): The term @(1R
xd
vc(xd; e2)¡ vn(xd; e2)dx)=@e2 expresses how much
an increase in e2 increases the di¤erence of likelihood of conviction when one has
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versus one has not committed the act and hence expresses how important greater
e¤ort in …nding the truth is for deterrence.
We state the result concerning xd in a separate proposition:
Proposition 3.2. In the absence of fairness concerns, if sanctions are monetary
and people are risk-neutral, …nes should be imposed on a person when, given the
received signal x about his behavior, this signal is more likely to be received if the
act has been committed than if it has not.
This result establishes the preponderance-of-the-evidence-standard as a bench-
mark.
As mentioned above, the modeling employed here does not apply directly to
such cases, e.g. certain murder-cases, where investigations are contingent on the
act. We shall brie‡y mention the result which applies to this kind of crime as far
as the standard of proof is concerned. When eg = p(e1)f R1x vc(x; e2)dx; deterrence
is maximized when
R 1
x vc(x;e
2)dx is maximized. Since sanction by assumption
does not involve social cost (and agents are risk-neutral), the optimal standard of
proof in this case would involve x = ¡1; i.e. when harm occurs sanction should
always follow.
In Appendix A we show that when a criminal case involves more than one
suspect, the speci…cation of the model nees to be changed and a similar result as
that just obtained concerning the optimal standard of proof when only deterrence
matters does not apply.
We will now provide some understanding of the proposition above and discuss
a particular implication.
3.1.2. Why Does the Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Standard Maxi-
mize Deterrence?
Before committing a criminal act, a person is likely to contemplate the information
or signals that alternative acts, criminal or non-criminal, will produce. Naturally,
some of the signals are more likely to be received by the court-system if the
criminal act will be committed than if it will not be. If for each such signal received
by the court there will be conviction, the contemplation of this signal by the
potentially criminal person will act as an inducement not to perform the criminal
act, since the expected pay-o¤ of the criminal act will hereby be diminished in
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relation to the expected pay-o¤ of non-criminal acts. The remaining signals are
more likely to be received by the judge if no criminal act has been performed.
If the receipt of each such signal leads to non-conviction, again this will act as
an inducement not to perform the criminal act: The person will think that this
favorable outcome is more likely if he does not commit the criminal act than
if he does. Thus, to maximize the di¤erence between the expected utility from
not committing and committing a crime, the court should convict whenever it
receives signals that are more likely to be received when the criminal act has been
committed than when it has not14.
3.1.3. On the Non-use of Ex-ante Probability of Guilt
The result that the optimal standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence-
standard tells us what information to use in reaching verdicts but, equally im-
portant, also what kind not to use. A preponderance-of-the-evidence standard
should be distinguished from a standard which passes a verdict of guilty when it
is more likely than not that the person is guilty. The notion of a probability of
guilt is problematic since to de…ne it we must set a priori probabilities of guilt
which are updated in a Bayesian fashion by the informativeness of the signal x:
Only if the a priori probability of a given apprehended person being criminal is
assumed to be equal to 1/2, can we say that when the standard of proof is xd
people are sanctioned when it is more likely than not that they are guilty. Rather,
the proposition should be interpreted as saying that under the given assumptions
(no fairness-utility, no risk-aversion, no social cost of imposing penalties) à priori
probabilities of guilt or innocence play no role in the optimal system of sanctions.
This relates to the example in the introduction where society A and B were to
decide on cases that were from the viewpoint of the concrete evidence identical
but where the ex-ante probability of guilt was much higher in society B than in
society A. The only di¤erence between the two societies lies in Z(g); the distribu-
tion function for the types, which a¤ects the à priori likelihood of guilt. Hence,
according to the proposition above there should be no di¤erence in the standard
of proof in the two societies. The density-functions vc and vn do not depend on
the distribution of types in the population but only on the accuracy of informa-
tion. Thus, the verdict should in both cases be ’guilty’ if the police measurement
is more likely to be realized when the evidence put before the judge is more likely
14Note that this is the universal principle in the case of risk-neutrality also for the kind of
crime where not committing the act implies no risk of conviction.
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to be the outcome of a theft than not. It may seem surprising that the optimal
system in this way totally disregards ex ante probabilities. But note that imposing
a …ne is costless to society and it may hence be worthwhile to impose a …ne even
when it is unlikely in a Bayesian sense that a person is guilty. It constitutes an
e¢cient way for society A of deterring its few potential o¤enders.
3.1.4. Non-monetary Sanctions
The result that the preponderance of the evidence standard is optimal and ex
ante probabilities irrelevant does not carry over to non-monetary sanctions that
are costly to apply. When
W =
Z 1
eg gz(g)dg¡ (1 ¡ Z(~g))h¡ e1 ¡ e2¡
c(f) ¤ p(e1)((1¡ Z(~g))
Z 1
x
vc(x; e2)dx +Z(~g)
Z 1
x
vn(x; e2)dx)
andeg = p(e1)f 1R
x
vc(x; e2) ¡ vn(x; e2)dx; the …rst-order condition becomes:
dW
dx
= @W
@eg ¤ @eg@x = p(e1) ¤ f ¤ (vn(x; e2d) ¡ vc(x; e2d))¤
z(eg)
24(h¡ eg) + c(f ) ¤ p(e1) ¤ 1Z
x
vc(x; e2) ¡ vn(x; e2)dx
35+
c(f ) ¤ p(e1) ¤ £Z(eg)vn(x; e2) + (1¡ Z(eg))vc(x; e2)¤ = 0
Deterrence is more important than when sanction is costless as can be seen
from the expression
z(eg)c(f) 1Z
x
vc(x;e2) ¡ vn(x; e2)dx
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but increasing x confers the bene…t of punishing both guilty and people innocent
people less, since:
c(f ) ¤ p(e1) ¤ £Z(eg)vn(x; e2) + (1¡ Z(eg))vc(x; e2)¤ > 0
the standard of proof is higher than the preponderance of the evidence standard
in this case. If x = xd then vn(x; e2d) ¡ vc(x; e2d) = 0; hence the derivative equals
the latter part c(f) ¤ p(e1) ¤ [Z(eg)vn(x; e2) + (1¡ Z(eg))vc(x; e2)] which as stated
is positive. Hence, it adds to welfare to increase x beyond xd:
It is also clear that the irrelevance of ex-ante probabilities no longer holds,
since Z(eg) and (1 ¡ Z(eg)) now enter the …rst-order condition but exactly how
ex ante probabilities enter the choice of standard of proof will not be explored
further here15.
4. The Case Including Fairness-utility
We shall follow Miceli [10],[11], Shavell-Polinsky[17] and Diamond [3] in the way
we formulate preferences for fairness. If a person is sanctioned at the level f
although the person is innocent, there will be a loss of utility in the population
(including his personal loss) of µ(f ) while if a guilty person goes free, there will
be a loss of utility of Q(0): If a guilty person is …ned f there will be a utility-gain
equal to Q(f). Thus, Q(f ) expresses the aggregate utility attached to alternative
levels of sanctions for guilty people while W (f ) expresses the aggregate utility
attached to punishing the innocent. µ(f), Q(f) and Q(0) can include the social
cost of punishing at the level f when the sanction is non-monetary. Hence, we
can exclude the cost of imprisonment explicitly in the analysis. If we express the
standard of proof in terms of the cut-o¤ signal x, the maximization problem can
now be expressed as:
max
x;e1;e2 ;f
W =
Z 1
eg gz(g)dg¡ (1 ¡ Z(~g))h
¡µ(f )Z(eg)p(e1) Z 1
x
vn(x; e2)dx
¡Q(0))(1¡ Z(eg))(1 ¡ p(e1))
¡Q(0)(1¡ Z(eg))p(e1)(1¡ Z 1
x
vc(x; e2)dx)
15Note that it should be analyzed together with the variable e1.
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+Q(f)(1¡ Z(eg))p(e1) Z 1
x
vc(x; e2)dx
¡e1 ¡ e2
where ~g = p(e1)f
Z
A
vc(x; e2)¡ vn(x; e2)dx
Some notation will be useful: W can be written as Wd +Wf ¡e1 ¡ e2 where
Wd =
R1eg gz(g)dg ¡ (1¡ Z(~g))h and
Wf = ¡µ(f )Z(eg)p(e1) Z 1
x
vn(x; e2)dx
¡Q(0))(1¡ Z(eg))(1 ¡ p(e1))
¡Q(0)(1¡ Z(eg))p(e1)(1¡ Z 1
x
vc(x; e2)dx)
+Q(f)(1 ¡ Z(eg))p(e1) Z 1
x
vc(x; e2)dx
Also, the W -function can be written: W (eg(f; e1; e2; x); f; e1; e2; x): Hence,
dW
df
=
@W
@eg @eg@f + @W@f
dW
de1
=
@W
@eg @eg@e1 + @W@e1
dW
de2
= @W
@eg @eg@e2 + @W@e2
dW
dx
=
@W
@eg @eg@x + @W@x
Note that the partial derivatives @W@f and
@W
@x can be written as
@Wf
@f and
@Wf
@x
while @W@e1 and
@W
@e2can be written as
@Wf
@e1 ¡ 1 and @W@e2 ¡ 1: The reason is that the
variables only a¤ect Wd through the eg(f; e1; e2; x)-function. Hence, we can write
the …rst-order conditions as:
dW
df
=
@W
@eg @eg@f + @Wf@f = 0
dW
de1 =
@W
@eg @eg@e1 + @Wf@e1 ¡ 1 = 0
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dW
de2
= @W
@eg @eg@e2 + @Wf@e2 ¡ 1 = 0
dW
dx
=
@W
@eg @eg@x + @Wf@x = 0
In this way we separate the e¤ects that depend on people being deterred and
the pure fairness-e¤ects (where the number of people deterred is held constant).
We will be interested in …nding the optimal standard of proof; to do so we
must to …nd interior solutions solve this simultaneous set of equations . We start
by …nding the right-hand sides of the derivatives just given, i.e. @Wf@f ;
@Wf
@e1 ;
@Wf
@e2
and @Wf@x :
4.1. The Case Without a Deterrence Motive
Let us assume that the number of people who violate the law is una¤ected by the
standard of proof and by the other variables: eg = g: Then the problem reduces
to:
max
x;e1 ;e2 ;f
Wf ¡ e1 ¡ e2
Denote optimal levels by e1f ; e2f ; ff and xf . We introduce the following notation:
T1 ´ probability of sanctioning the innocent = p(e1)
Z 1
x
vn(x; e2)dx
T2 ´ probability of not sanctioning the guilty = (1¡ p(e1)
Z 1
x
vc(x; e2)dx)
C ´ probability of sanctioning the guilty = p(e1)
Z 1
x
vc(x; e2)dx
In the following section, we analyze the optimal levels of sanctions and en-
forcement. The section can be skipped by the reader who is only interested in the
results concerning the optimal standard of proof.
4.1.1. Optimal Sanctions and Enforcement
e1f :
@Wf
@e1 is given by
p0(e1)
·
(Q(0) + Q(f))(1¡ Z(g))
Z 1
x
vc(x; e2)dx¡ Z(g)
Z 1
x
vn(x; e2)dx)
¸
=
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@C
@e1
(Q(0) + Q(f))(1¡ Z(g)) ¡ @T1
@e1
Z(g)µ(f):
Thus, in an interior maximum (e1f ; e2f ; ff ,xf ) it must be the case that:
@C
@e1
(Q(0) +Q(ff ))(1¡ Z(g)) ¡ @T1@e1Z(g)µ(ff) = 1
where @C@e1 and
@T1
@e1 are evaluated in (e
1
f ; e2f ; ff ,xf). This and some of the other
results of this section are similar to the results obtained by Miceli [11].
Increased enforcement e¤ort increases the likelihood both of convicting a guilty
person and of convicting an innocent person. If he is guilty and convicted there
is a double gain Q(0) +Q(f); the person who would unfairly go free is now fairly
punished. If he is innocent and convicted there is a cost of µ(ff) as expressed in
the last term.
It is worth noting that if accuracy is high enforcement creates fairness and
that in this case the idea of setting f at a very high level in order to be able
to set enforcement at a low level may not be very attractive from a fairness
perspective. When fairness is an issue and accuracy is not too low, an interior
solution (f < fmax) hence becomes more likely. Still, the possibility that e1f should
be zero exists. A necessary condition for this to be optimal is that 1=p0(0) >
¡Z(g)µ(ff) R1xf vn(x; e2f)dx) + (1¡ Z(g))Q(0) R 1xf vc(x; e2f)dx+
(1 ¡ Z(g))Q(ff)
R1
xf
vc(x; e2f )dx
The interpretation is that enforcement should take place if it is not too inef-
fective in apprehending people and if apprehension is bene…cial in the sense that
it creates more fairness than unfairness.
e2f :
@Wf
@e2 is given by
(1¡Z(g))p(e1)@(
R 1
x vc(x; e
2)dx)
@e2
(Q(0)+Q(f ))¡Z(g))p(e1)@(
R 1
x vn(x; e
2)dx)
@e2
µ(f)
=
@C
@e2
(Q(0) +Q(f))(1 ¡ Z(g))¡ @T1
@e2
Z(g)µ(f):
Note that @(
R 1
x vn(x;e
2)dx)
@e2 =
@T1
@e2 is negative. Precision creates the bene…t that
guilty persons may be more adequately punished, which is expressed by @C@e2 (Q(0)+
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Q(f ))(1 ¡ Z(g)) as well as the bene…t that innocent people will less often be
convicted, which is expressed by the positive term ¡@T1@e2Z(g)µ(f ):
In an interior maximum (e1f ; e2f ; ff ; xf ) it must be the case that:
@C
@e2
(Q(0) +Q(ff ))(1¡ Z(g)) ¡ @T1@e2Z(g)µ(ff) = 1
If
(1¡Z(g))p(e1f)
@(
R1
xf
vc(x; 0)dx)
@e2
(Q(0)+Q(ff ))¡Z(g))p(e1f )
@(
R1
xf
vn(x; 0)dx)
@e2
µ(ff)
< 1
and we assume that informativeness is a concave function of e216;then e2f = 0:
ff :
@Wf
@f
= ¡Z(g)p(e1)
Z 1
x
vn(x; e2)dxµ0(f ) + (1¡ Z(g))p(e1)
Z 1
xf
vc(x; e2)dxQ0(f)
Hence:@Wf@f = C(1¡ Z(g))Q0(f )¡ T1Z(g)µ0(f )
In an interior maximum (e1f ; e2f ; ff ,xf) it must hence be the case that:
µ0(ff )
Q0(ff)
=
C
T1
(1¡ Z(g))
Z(g)
where T1 and C are, respectively, the probabilities of sanctioning the innocent and
sanctioning the guilty given (e1f ; e2f ; ff ,xf)17. Increasing the …ne imposes a cost on
those who are convicted innocently while it may confer a bene…t in punishing the
guilty in a more adequate fashion. Assuming that µ is convex and Q is concave,
the optimal sanction will be higher the greater the accuracy of trial ( CT1 ) and the
higher the crime-rate (1¡Z(g))Z(g) . The optimal sanction may well be lower but may
16 I.e. @(
R 1
x vc(x;e2 )dx)
@e2
is decreasing in e2 and
@(
R 1
x vn(x;e2 )dx)
@e2
is increasing in e2 (from one
negative number to a numerically smaller negative number).
17Su¢cient conditions for an interior maximum, 0 < f < 1; are: Z(g) R 1x vn(x; e2)dxµ0(0) <
(1 ¡ Z(g)) R 1x vc(x; e2)dxQ0(0)
and Z(g)
R 1
x vn(x; e2)dxµ
0(f ) > (1 ¡ Z(g)) R 1x vc(x; e2)dxQ0(f ) for f > K where K is some
high number. The second condition wecan assume to be ful…lled, but the …rst may not be, and
we will keep the possibility in mind that fairness considerations may suggest not sanctioning at
all.
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also be higher than the maximal. (If it is higher than the maximal sanction we
assume that it will be set at the maximal level fmax since this is the maximum
amount people can e¤ectively be sanctioned. The assumption here is that people
are concerned with the level of sanctions actually carried out and not with the
symbolic value of imposing a high sanction).
4.1.2. The Optimal Standard of Proof
@Wf
@x
= p(e1)
£
Z(g)vn(x; e2)µ(f )¡ ((1 ¡ Z(g))vc(x; e2)(Q(0) + Q(ff))¤
In an interior maximum (e1f ; e2f ; ff ,xf), it must hence be the case that:
vn(xf ; e2f)
vc(xf ; e2f)
=
1 ¡ Z(g)
Z(g)
¤ (Q(0) + Q(ff))
µ(ff)
:
For proof, see Appendix B. A similar result is obtained by Miceli [11].
The question arises, however, whether there exists an interior optimal level
of xf : There may not exist a solution to the equation above or the solution may
conceivably represent a global minimum. We can distinguish three cases:
Case 1: lim
x!¡1
vn(x;e2f)
vc(x;e2f)
< 1¡Z(g)Z(g) ¤ (Q(0)+Q(ff))µ(ff) . In this case there is no solution
to the equation; it never adds to welfare to increase the standard of proof and
hence xf = ¡1: It is the case where it is overwhelmingly important to punish
the guilty and unimportant not to punish the innocent.
Case 2: lim
x!1
vn(x;e2f)
vc(x;;e2f )
> 1¡Z(g)Z(g) ¤ (Q(0)+Q(ff))µ(ff) . In this case it always adds welfare to
increase the standard of proof since it is all-important not to punish the innocent,
hence xf = 1: (In this partial analysis we take as given the level of e1f : In the
general analysis xf = 1 will be ruled out as an equilibrium since a better way of
achieving the result that nobody is convicted is to let e1 equal zero).
Case 3: If neither of the two conditions above obtains, then there exists a
solution to the equation (by continuity and by the fact that vn(x;e
2
f)
vc(x;e2f)
is decreasing).
Denote this solution xf : The second order condition for a maximum becomes: If
v0c(xf ; e2f ) < 0 :
v 0n(xf ; e2f)
v 0c(xf ; e2f)
>
1 ¡ Z(g)
Z(g)
¤ (Q(0) + Q(ff))
µ(ff)
:
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If v 0c(xf ; e2) > 0:
v 0n(xf ; e2f)
v 0c(xf ; e2f)
<
1 ¡ Z(g)
Z(g)
¤ (Q(0) + Q(ff))
µ(ff)
:
Both of these conditions are ful…lled when the likelihood ratio is monotone:
vn(x;e2f)
vc(x;e2f)
decreasing in x implies that
v0n(x; e2f )vc(x; e2f) ¡ v0c(x; e2f)vn(x; e2f) < 0
which implies that v
0
n(x;e2f)
v0c(x;e2f)
> vn(x;e
2
f)
vc(x;e2f )
when v0c(x; e2f) < 0 and
v0n(x;e2f )
v0c(x;e2f)
< vn(x;e
2
f)
vc(x;e2f)
when v0c(x; e2f) > 0: The claim then follows from:
vn(xf ;e2f )
vc(xf ;e2f )
= 1¡Z(g)Z(g) ¤ (Q(0)+Q(ff))µ(ff ) :
We can thus state the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1. If only fairness matters, and if the likelihood ratio is monotone,
the optimal standard of proof xf is given by:
vn(xf ; e2f)
vc(xf ; e2f)
= 1 ¡ Z(g)
Z(g)
¤ (Q(0) + Q(ff))
µ(ff)
:
unless lim
x!¡1
vn(x;e2f)
vc(x;e2f)
< 1¡Z(g)Z(g) ¤ (Q(0)+Q(ff ))µ(ff) or limx!1
vn(x;e2f)
vc(x;e2f)
> 1¡Z(g)Z(g) ¤ (Q(0)+Q(ff ))µ(ff) : The
exceptions represent the extreme outcomes of either ’always’ or ’never’ convicting.
To interpret this standard of evidence, note that (Q(0)+Q(ff ))µ(ff) expresses the
gravity of false acquittals relative to false convictions. This ratio determines how
many o¤enders we are willing to let go unpunished in order to avoid that one
person is falsely convicted. Assume that we are willing to let exactly ten guilty
people go free each time we convict an innocent person. Consider a situation
where one in a thousand people are criminals. Then the critical level of evidence
is that which is ten thousand times more likely to be forthcoming when the person
has in fact violated the law than when he has not. When this kind of evidence is
presented in court, we should expect that only in one out of ten cases the person
will not be guilty, which is the ratio we are willing to accept.
Note that:
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1. The ratio of falsely convicted to falsely acquitted may be very di¤erent from
the ratio (Q(0)+Q(ff))µ(ff ) : The latter ratio expresses the relative costs of false
acquittals and false convictions that are relevant when considering marginal
changes in the standard of proof. So it is only at the margin that the ratio
of falsely acquitted and falsely convicted equals (Q(0)+Q(ff))µ(ff ) : This distinction
will be illustrated in the example below. It follows that if we estimate that
the actual number of falsely acquitted is e.g. twenty times higher than the
number of falsely convicted while we think the cost of falsely convicting is
only ten times higher than the cost of falsely convicting, we should not jump
to the conclusion that the standard of proof should be lowered.
2. In the pure deterrence case the optimal standard of proof was a preponder-
ance of the evidence -standard : vn(x; e2f)=vc(x; e2f) = 1: When only fairness
matters, the standard of proof is stricter than the preponderance of the evi-
dence -standard when there are more innocent than guilty people and when
the ’cost’ of punishing the innocent is greater than that of letting a guilty
person o¤ without punishment. Since these assumptions are often met, we
can say that the standard of proof is in most normal circumstances stricter
when fairness is the issue than when deterrence is the issue. However, we
cannot exclude that in rare situations fairness concerns may call for a more
lenient standard of proof than xd.
These results seem broadly in line with empirical observation, e.g. that the
standard of evidence is stricter for criminal o¤ences than for civil o¤ences.
On the Non-use of Ex-ante Probability of Guilt It is worth noting that
the the standard of proof based on the evidence will be stricter the greater the
fraction of law abiding citizens. This reveals an important di¤erence between
the pure deterrence and the pure fairness case. When only deterrence matters,
and sanctions are monetary, the optimal standard of proof does not depend on
à priori probabilities of guilt or innocence, as noted above. In contrast, as the
result just stated reveals, these play an important role when the aim is justice.
The reason behind this result is that probabilities of making type-1 and type-2
errors when using a given standard based only on the evidence depends on à priori
probabilities of a person being criminal. The probabilities of making errors are
in themselves not important when the aim is to control behavior; important is
then how to construct the system such that a person can change the probability
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of sanction through his action. In the example mentioned in the introduction, if
society A cares for justice they will acquit the alleged criminal on the grounds
that the probability that it is all a mistake is high while society B should pass a
verdict of guilty on the grounds that doing so is likely to create more fairness than
unfairness. By following this policy, society A will rarely let a criminal o¤ and
often let an innocent man go, while society B will also …nd their policy optimal
since they will often sanction a guilty and rarely convict an innocent person18.
We shall now turn to the realistic case where both fairness and deterrence
matter.
4.2. The Case With Both a Deterrence and a Fairness Motive
In the section above with only a concern for fairness the partial derivatives
@W
@f ;
@W
@e1 ;
@W
@e2 and
@W
@x were found:
We now turn to that part of the derivative of social welfare that depends on a
deterrent e¤ect.
Derivation and rewriting yields the following result:
@W
@eg = [(h¡ eg) + Q(0)T2 ¡ T1µ(f) ¡ cQ(f)]
The positive e¤ects of deterrence are: the smaller harm to society (h¡eg), fewer
false convictions Q(0)T2 since fewer guilty people (Q(0) is likely to be positive, it
is de…ned as the disutility of not punishing a guilty person); the negative e¤ects
are: more falsely convicted,T1µ(f); since more innocent people, and fewer people
justly punished; cQ(f);since fewer guilty people (Q(f ) is likely to be positive, it is
de…ned as the utility of punishing a criminal). Following Shavell and Polinsky we
can de…ne the full deterrence ideal as that level of eg where @W@eg = 0 hence where
[(h ¡ eg) + Q(0)T2 ¡ T1µ(f) ¡ cQ(f)] = 0:
In the following section, we analyze the optimal levels of sanctions and en-
forcement. The section can be skipped by the reader who is only interested in the
results concerning the optimal standard of proof.
18This di¤erence reveals a con‡ict between two di¤erent notions of fairness. If the two societies
are two neighborhoods of the same country (e.g. a poor and a rich) using á priori probabilities
will con‡ict with the notion that there should be equality before the law. Note that in the model
above this trade-o¤ does not occur since there is only one group of people; people within this
group are assumed indistinguishable from the point of view of the judge.
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4.2.1. Optimal Sanctions and Enforcement
The full derivatives can now be stated:
f : The condition which must be ful…lled in an interior maximum, is:
®z(eg)@W
@eg + Q0(f)T1Z(g)¡ µ0(f)C(1¡ Z(g)) = 0
where ® = @eg@f :
The possibility that f = fmax is worth examining since W is not di¤erentiable
in fmax. Two conditions must be met for fmax to be a optimum. When f = fmax
the right-derivative @eg@f (+) is zero, thus ®(+) = 0; and hence cQ0(fmax)(1¡ Z(eg))¡
T1µ0(fmax)Z(eg) must be negative (if cQ0(fmax)(1 ¡ Z(eg)) ¡ T1µ0(fmax)Z(eg) > 0
increasing f will be worthwhile since there is no deterrent e¤ect but the impact
on fairness is positive). And, as the second condition,
®(¡)z(eg) [(h¡ eg) + Q(0)T2 ¡ T1µ(fmax) ¡ cQ(fmax)] +
cQ0(fmax)(1¡ Z(eg))¡ T1µ0(fmax)Z(eg) ¸ 0
where ®(¡) is the left-derivative of @eg@f at fmax. We see that ifQ0(fmax) is su¢ciently
negative (the optimal penalty for the guilty is thought to be less than the maximal
penalty) and µ0(fmax) su¢ciently positive (lowering the size of the sanction from
the maximal level will decrease the conceived degree of unfairness, cet. par.), then
the optimal sanction will be lower than the maximal. On the other hand, we also
see that if people want to punish criminals harshly for retributive reasons it may
be that fairness considerations (despite fear of punishing the innocent) overall lead
to higher sanctions than what is warranted from the viewpoint of prevention.
e1 : De…ne @eg@e1 which is equal to p0(e1)f RA vc(x; e2)¡ vn(x; e2)dx as ¯:
The …rst-order condition becomes:
¯z(eg)@W
@eg + @C@e1 (Q(0) + Q(f ))(1¡ Z(g)) ¡ @T1@e1Z(g)µ(f ) = 1
The possibility that e1 should be set at its minimal level exists in this situation
as well as the possibility of not enforcing at all ( e1 = 0); deriving when these
cases arise is quite straightforward but will not be undertaken here.
e2 : De…ne @eg@e2 as `: The …rst-order condition becomes: `z(eg)@W@eg + @C@e2 (Q(0) +
Q(f ))(1¡ Z(g)) ¡ @T1@e2Z(g)µ(f ) = 1:
21
4.2.2. The Standard of Proof
Denote @~g@x = ¡f ¤ p(e1)(vc(x; e2) ¡ vn(x; e2)) by °:
We obtain the …rst-order condition:
°z(eg)@W
@eg + p(e1) £Z(g)vn(x; e2)µ(f) ¡ ((1¡ Z(g))vc(x; e2)(Q(0) + Q(ff))¤ = 0
=)
°z(eg)@W@eg + @T1@x Z(g)µ(f )¡ @C@x (Q(0) + Q(f))(1¡ Z(g)) = 0
Note that ° is negative if x > xd (xd maximizes deterrence) and positive if
x < xd:
The simultaneous set of equations which must be ful…lled in an interior opti-
mum (0 < f < fmax) is hence:
®z(eg)@W
@eg + Q0(f )T1Z(g) ¡ µ0(f )C(1¡ Z(g)) condition for f
¯z(eg)@W
@eg + @C@e1(Q(0) + Q(f ))(1¡ Z(g)) ¡ @T1@e1Z(g)µ(f ) = 1 cond. for e1
`z(eg)@W
@eg + @C@e2 (Q(0) +Q(f))(1 ¡ Z(g))¡ @T1@e2Z(g)µ(f) = 1 cond. for e2
°z(eg)@W@eg + @T1@x Z(g)µ(f) ¡ @C@x (Q(0) + Q(f ))(1¡ Z(g)) = 0 cond. for x
This is the simultaneous set of four equations which determines the four vari-
ables (f; e1; e2; x) when the solution is interior. It should be noted that interior
solutions are more likely when fairness matters since the outcome where a very
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high penalty is imposed while very few people are apprehended will tend to lack
appeal from a fairness viewpoint, as argued above. From these equations we can
do comparative statics analysis to derive the consequences for criminal policy of
e.g. an increase in the µ or Q-functions or of a decrease in the perceived level of
accuracy, as has followed from the recent use of DNA-tests. However, the main
concern lies in establishing the optimal level of the standard of proof. It can
now be established that the optimal standard of proof will usually lie in between
the level which is optimal from a deterrence perspective ( xd) and that which is
optimal from a pure deterrence perspective xf : Recall that xd is given by:
vn(xd; e2)
vc(xd; e2)
= 1
while xf is given by
vn(xf ; e2)
vc(xf ; e2)
=
1¡ Z(eg)
Z(eg) ¤ (Q(0) + Q(f ))µ(f ) :
The claim is hence that the optimal likelihood ratio for conviction will usually lie
in the interval
h
1; 1¡Z(eg)Z(eg) ¤ (Q(0)+Q(f))µ(f)
i
when both deterrence and fairness matter.
There are two basic cases to be distinguished: One where fairness concerns
constrains deterrence, which we will de…ne here as the case where the full deter-
rence ideal (de…ned above) is higher than the fairness ideal, and the other where
fairness concerns stretch deterrence. More accurately, we will de…ne the …rst case
as that where it would be optimal to set punishment at a higher level were it not
for pure fairness reasons, and the second as the case where it would be optimal
to set punishment at a lower level absent (pure) fairness concerns.
Proposition 4.2. If fairness constrains deterrence, the optimal standard of proof
will lie between xd and xf :
Proof: When fairness constrains deterrence, from a full deterrence perspective
it would increase welfare to impose higher f . Hence,
®z(eg) [(h¡ eg) +Q(0)T2 ¡ T1µ(f) ¡ cQ(f)] > 0
This implies that
z(eg) [(h ¡ eg) +Q(0)T2 ¡T1µ(f) ¡ cQ(f)] > 0;
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since ® > 0. There are two possibilities to consider.
a) xd < xf :
b) xd ¸ xf
In a), the typical case, x¤ will be higher than xd but lower than xf : This can
be proven by contradiction:
1) If x¤ < xd then ° > 0 by the fact that xd is the deterrence ideal ( @eg@x = 0);
hence °z(eg) [(h ¡ eg) + Q(0)T2 ¡ T1µ(f )¡ cQ(f )]> 0 from above. Then @Wf@x must
be negative which by the above-proven concavity of @Wf@x implies that x
¤ > xf .
But this is a contradiction since x¤ cannot be smaller than xd and larger than xf
when xd < xf .
2) If x¤ > xf > xd; then ° < 0;hence °z(eg) [(h ¡ eg) + Q(0)T2 ¡ T1µ(f )¡ cQ(f)]
< 0 and @Wf@x must be positive. This implies x
¤ < xf ; a contradiction.
In b) which is the atypical case, x¤ will be higher than xf but lower than xd:
The same proof through contradiction can be applied here.
QED
Proposition 4.3. If fairness concerns lead to overdeterrence compared with the
full deterrence ideal, the optimal standard of proof will not lie between xd and xf :
Proof: This follows from the proof just given when the fact that
[(h¡ eg) +Q(0)T2 ¡ T1µ(f) ¡ cQ(f)]
is now negative is taken into account. This fact changes the sign of
°z(eg) [(h ¡ eg) +Q(0)T2 ¡ T1µ(f) ¡ cQ(f)]
and hence leads to the opposite result of the above. QED
In the case where xd < xf , consider the point x = xf : This point maximizes
fairness in a sense (keeping deterrence constant). If x is decreased there will be two
e¤ects: More deterrence (by the fact that x will be closer to xd) and less fairness.
Both of these e¤ects are bad since we start from a situation of overdeterrence.
If, on the other hand x is increased, deterrence will su¤er which is good and the
negative e¤ect on fairness will only be second-order when the increase is small.
An increase beyond xf will hence improve welfare19.
When fairness concerns lead to overdeterrence it may hence be optimal to
stretch the standard of proof beyond what is optimal from a pure fairness per-
spective in order to mitigate over-deterrence.
19By a similar reasoning it cna be shown that it may be optimal to decrease x below xd : We
shall not analyze when it is optimal to sacri…ce deterrence by sanctioning even when it is more
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4.3. Examples
The following example is intended to illustrate the kind of trade-o¤ between de-
terrence and fairness described above. In reality, the numbers will be uncertain.
Still, it is important to know how the standard of proof should be determined if the
variables were all known. Consider the crime of sexual o¤ense (such as violation).
Assume that the number of o¤enders to non-o¤enders is in the range of 1:10000 (a
number which is not …xed but may to some extent be a¤ected by sanctions). Let
there be 10 mill people in the population out of which 1000 people are likely to
commit a serious sexual o¤ense at some point. Assume further that if the crime
is committed, the evidence x that will come up in a thorough police investigation
has a random component; we assume the evidence is normally distributed with
mean equal to 14 and standard deviation equal to 4. Its density is 1
4
p
2¼
e¡
(x¡14)2
32 :
If the crime is not committed, the mean will equal 2 and the standard deviation
will be 4: The density function will be 1
4
p
2¼
e¡
(x¡2)2
32 :
The likelihood ratio equals
1
4
p
2¼e
¡ (x¡2)
2
32
1
4
p
2¼
e¡
(x¡14)2
32
: It is decreasing as can be seen graph-
ically:
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
 ratio
10 15 20 25 30 35x
Let the fraction (Q(0)+Q(f ))µ(f ) equal 1=10 such that
1¡Z(eg)
Z(eg) ¤ (Q(0)+Q(f ))µ(f ) is approxi-
mately 1:100000. Set µ(f ) = 10:
likely that a crime has not been committed. Note, however, that in the case where fairness
dominates deterrence concerns, in the sense that it is optimal to create overdeterrence, it seems
unlikely that this should be optimal.
Likewise, we will not explore the case where xd > xf further; as mentioned the more realistic
case is xd < xf .
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Assume that p(e1) = 1, investigations will take place. Assume further that for
each year’s increase in expected sanction the number of potential o¤enders who
will be deterred by the increase equals z: Part of the deterrence e¤ect is likely to
be due to stigma. Assume that f is …ve years’ imprisonment.
The question is now how the size of harm h and z a¤ect the optimal standard
of proof.
If fairness is the only motive to punish, then given the accuracy of the evidence,
punishment would virtually never occur. Thus,
1
4
p
2¼
e¡
(x¡2)2
32
1
4
p
2¼ e
¡ (x¡14)232
= 1=100000 =) x = 23: 351
To …nd the probability of conviction if one has committed the act, this number
is inserted in the cumulative normal distribution. It equals
1¡ NormalDist(8 + 4
3
ln 100 000; 14; 4) = :0097
If one sets the standard of proof at this level, out of 1000 o¤enders, only 1000 ¤
:0097 = 9: 7 will be punished. Thus, a vast majority of the guilty will go free.
If one has not committed the act, there is almost zero probability that one
will be convicted:
(1 ¡ 1
4
p
2¼
R 8+ 43 ln100 000¡1 e¡ (x¡2)232 dx) ¤ 107 = : 471: Thus, only half a person will
be innocently convicted.
While the number of unfairly punished is low, the number of people who are
guilty but nevertheless go free is very high. Yet from a fairness perspective this is
the best one can do; the problem is that the evidence is not su¢ciently conclusive
to allow a satisfactory number of convictions without an unsatisfactory number
of false convictions. (In cases of sexual o¤ense, a higher level of certainty can
no doubt be obtained). Thus, if the likelihood ratio is set at 1=1000; the same
calculations as above yield the outcome that 700:0 will be punished unfairly while
788: 87 will go free although they are guilty. If set at 1=10000 942 people will go
free and 24 will be punished unfairly. Both of these alternatives ar worse in terms
of overall unfair costs.
Note how misleading it is to assume that the ratio (Q(0)+Q(f ))µ(f ) will in optimum
equal the actual ratio of falsely acquitted to falsely convicted.
Let us analyze how strong the deterrence e¤ect has to be for it to be optimal to
set the standard of proof at 1=10000 rather than at 1=100000: The unfairness cost
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of a standard of proof equal to 1=10000 equals 942 + 240 = 1182 The unfairness
cost of a standard of proof equal to 1=100000 equals 990; 3 + 4:71 t 995:
The expected sanction when the standard is 1=100000 equals approximately
two weeks (…ve years times the probability of charges being levelled of less than
one per cent). Naturally, stigma may follow and increase the cost substantially
for some types of o¤enders.
The expected sanction when the standard is 1=10000 equals approximately a
month and a half since the probability of conviction is now 2,4%. If we think that
the loss of utility su¤ered by society, including of course mainly the victim, from
three sexual violations equals the loss from falsely convicting one person, then
the number of deterred o¤enders by an increase from 1% to 2,4% in conviction
probability needs to be 1182¡9953:33 = 56: 156: Out of 1000 o¤enders we then need to
deter 56 for it to be worthwhile. If we consider the disutility of a sexual violation
as serious as the disutility of a false conviction, we need to deter around 19 people
in order for it to be optimal to lower the standard of proof.
To illustrate in a slightly di¤erent way how our results may be applied in a
real case, we may imagine ourselves to be a judge who must decide whether or
not to convict an alleged o¤ender in a given case where the evidence is given asex. Let us imagine that we can establish with some degree of con…dence that the
probability of the given evidence forthcoming if the person has committed the
crime (vc (ex)) would be, say, around 25 % while the probability that the same
evidence would be forthcoming if the person has not committed the crime (vn (ex))
would be something like 2 %:We can also imagine that the à priori probability of a
person committing the crime (1¡Z(eg)) is 5 %: If we know the relative seriousness
of false convictions vs. false acquittals, i.e. if we know (Q(0)+Q(f))µ(f ) ; we would be
able to make a …rst test as to whether the person should be found guilty: Given ex;
we can calculate the fairness related costs and bene…ts of convicting the person.
The probability of ex is given by
prob(x)=prob(ex j crime) ¤ prob(crime)+ prob(ex j no-crime) ¤ prob(no crime):
The probability that he is guilty is calculated by Bayesian updating as follows:
prob(crimej ex)= prob(ex j crime)¤prob(crime)prob(ex) = :25¤0:05:0315 = : 4 while prob(no-crimej ex)
= :6
Thus, with this evidence and this à priori probability, the person should not be
convicted on grounds of fairness unless one considers it more (one and a half times
more) important to sanction a guilty person than to not sanction an innocent.
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If numbers were di¤erent, we may discover at this point that whether or not
there is a deterrent e¤ect we should convict the person on fairness grounds alone.
If, e.g. we consider it ten times more important not to sanction than an innocent
than to sanction a guilty, and if the numbers above were vc (ex) = 90 %; vn
(ex) = 0:1 % and 1¡Z(eg) = 50%; then prob(crime given ex)= :9¤0:5: 4505 = : 99889 and
we would sanction the person unless the ratio of seriousness is around 1:1000.
Returning to the former case where the probability of unlawful behavior was
only 40%, the question is how we should consider the deterrent e¤ect of convicting
given ex: Let us assume f = 1 and p(e1) = 1. Calculations above have given
us the expression: f ¤ (vc(ex) ¡ vn (ex)) ¤ z(eg) ¤ h as the size of the deterrent
welfare-e¤ect (ignoring cross-e¤ects, i.e. mainly that the deterred people risk
being falsely convicted). Thus, when considering the deterrent e¤ect we should
calculate the change in expected sanction from convicting on the given evidence:
(0:25¡0:02)¤ f = 0:23. We then need to estimate how many people are deterred
by one unit of extra deterrence z(eg), in other words we must ascertain the number
of people who will be deterred by the increase in sanction just calculated and
multiply this number by h. The relevant comparison hence becomes:
Cost of conviction: µ(1) ¤ 0:6
Cost of acquittal: (Q(0) + Q(f)) ¤ 0:4 + 0:23 ¤ z(eg) ¤ h:
Note that apart from preferences (µ and Q and h) what the judge needs to
know is vc(ex), vn (ex), Z(eg) and z(eg).
5. An Extension
Several issues have not been touched upon in this paper. We shall only mention
one: risk-aversion, which is likely to be an important factor. It enters both into the
incentive constraint and into the social welfare consequences of applying sanctions.
Applying sanctions with some probability incurs a social loss when people are risk-
averse. If people are strongly risk-averse, they may also be strongly averse to the
possibility of being falsely convicted, and this factor seems likely to call for a
stricter standard of proof. On he other hand, they may also be very averse to the
possibility of becoming a victim of crime. How exactly risk-aversion a¤ects the
optimal standard of proof will be left to future research.
6. Conclusion
The main points are the following:
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- When only deterrence matters and sanctions are monetary, the optimal stan-
dard of proof is the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. This means that the
likelihood ratio vn(xd;e
2
d)
vc(xd;e2d)
equals one.
- When only deterrence matters and sanctions impose a cost on society, the
standard of proof is higher than the the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
-When only fairness matters, the optimal likelihood ratio vn(xf ;e
2
f )
vc(xf ;e2f )
equals 1¡Z(g)Z(g) ¤
(Q(0)+Q(ff))
µ(ff)
. It hence re‡ects the ratio of criminals in the population and the rel-
ative severity of punishing the innocent vs. acquitting the guilty.
When both deterrence and fairness matter the optimal likelihood ratio, except
when there is overdeterrence, lies in the interval
h
1; 1¡Z(g)Z(g) ¤ (Q(0)+Q(ff))µ(ff )
i
. Where
in the interval it lies depends on the weight of fairness vs. deterrence motives.
-When only deterrence matters and sanctions are monetary, ex-ante probabil-
ities (the fraction of criminals in the population) hence do not matter whereas
ex-ante probabilities are important for the standard of proof when the issue is
fairness.
-It is important to view the optimal standard of proof in terms of marginal
changes. The question is what the e¤ect is of a marginal change in the standard
of proof. Hence, if the general sentiment in society is roughly that the cost of
punishing an innocent person is ten times higher than that of falsely acquitting
a guilty person ((Q(0)+Q(ff ))µ(ff) is 1=10), while it is believed that twenty people go
free every time an innocent is sanctioned, this does not in itself tell us that the
standard of proof should be lowered. The relevant question is whether a marginal
change in the standard of proof creates a ratio of extra false convictions to extra
false acquittals that corresponds to their relative costliness.
-Apart from preferences (µ and Q and h) what the judge needs to know to
decide a case where the evidence is ex is vc(ex), vn (ex), Z(eg) and z(eg).
7. Appendix A
We will show that when the actions of more than one person are involved the
analysis becomes more complicated and a result such as that obtained above about
the preponderance of the evidence being optimal when only deterrence matters
does not apply. We do not model the case in generality but take a simpli…ed
model to show a general point. Assume that two people may commit a murder. If
A does it, there will be a density-function fA(x; e2) of the evidence vector x while
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if B does it there will be a density-function fB(x;e2): Assume also that other
assumptions of the model in the text are maintained, e.g. that sanctions involve
zero cost to society. If only deterrence matters, it may be thought that it would
be optimal to convict A if
fA(x; e2) > fB(x; e2)
and vice-versa. However, this is not generally so. Imagine e.g. that there are
three states of nature: x1 = (1; 0; 0);
x2 = (0; 1; 0) and x3 = (0; 0; 1): If B commits the crime the three states obtain
with the probabilities (0:9; 0:1; 0) while if A commits the crime the probabilities
of the three states are (0:8; 0:09; 0:11): If x1 occurs, B should be punished if the
rule above applies ( fA(x; e2) < fB(x; e2)) . But this may be enough to deter B
and it may therefore be optimal to sanction A in the other two states to deter
him also, although in one of them fA(x; e2) < fB(x; e2): Thus, what corresponds
to a preponderance of the evidence standard is not necessarily optimal when more
than one person is involved.
8. Appendix B
Finding x¤f : The criterion function can be written as follows when we only include
terms that incorporate x, and reduce terms:
¡Z(g)p(e1)
Z 1
x
vn(x; e2)dxµ(f ¤)
¡(1 ¡ Z(g))(1¡ p(e1)
Z 1
x
vc(x; e2)dx))Q(0)
+(1¡ Z(g))p(e1)
Z 1
x
vc(x; e2)dxQ(f ¤)
Di¤erentiating with respect to x yields:
Z(g)p(e1)vn(x; e2)µ(f) ¡ (1¡ Z(g))p(e1)vc(x; e2)Q(0)¡
(1¡ Z(g))p(e1)vc(x; e2)Q(f)
which must be zero in the optimum. Thus, an interior maximum, if it exists, must
ful…ll the condition:
vn(xf ; e2)p(e1)µ(f)¡(1¡Z(g))p(e1)vc(xf ; e2)Q(0)¡(1¡Z(g))p(e1)vc(xf ; e2)Q(f)
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= 0
which yields the stated condition:
vn(xf ; e2)=vc(xf ; e2) = (1¡Z(g))Z(g) (Q(0) + Q(f ))=µ(f ):
QED:
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